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abstract  
The  centrality of learners and their learning in contemporary educational discourse and 
practice, seems to suggest that the self of the student should be at the heart of the 
educational endeavour. This is not just an educational programme, but actually an expression 
of a particular way of thinking about human beings and their position in the world; a way of 
thinking which, after Levinas, I characterise as egological. In this paper I explore an alternative 
approach that centres on the suggestion that everything begins with what is given to us, 
rather than what is claimed, constructed or interpreted by us. I explore this philosophically 
through a discussion of ideas from Jean-Luc Marion around the phenomenon and 
phenomenology of ‘giveness’. I connect this to a critical discussion of the role of learning in 
education and explore three ways in which teaching manifests itself as a gift that occurs 
beyond learning. 
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‘And when they were come into the house, they saw the young child with Mary his mother, 
and fell down, and worshipped him: and when they had opened their treasures, they 




It is one thing to say that we live in interesting times, but yet another to come up with an 
accurate diagnosis of our historical moment. We are witnessing an intensification and 
acceleration of the ecological crisis. And we are witnessing a democratic crisis, particularly 
manifest in the rise of (narrow) nationalist and (right-wing) populist politics. Not everyone 
agrees, of course, and the disagreement about the truth of the ecological crisis is perhaps the 
third element characterising our current age – an element sometimes referred to as ‘post-
truth’. I am inclined to see ‘post-truth’ not so much as an epistemological issue, but first and 
foremost as a political one, as post-truth seems to boil down to the claim that everyone has 
the right and should have the right to their own truth. Seen in this way, ‘post-truth’ is closely 
connected to the claim from identity politics that everyone should have the right to their own 
identity which may amount to the suggestion that everyone should have the right to their 
own world. Putting it this way, begins to reveal the connection between the ecological crisis, 
the democratic crisis and the crisis of truth, as all three seem to be, in some way, a denial of 
the world itself, that is, a denial of reality. 
 
Some see ‘post-truth’ as the direct consequence of postmodern and poststructural themes 
that characterised philosophical and cultural discussions in the last decades of the 20th 






and progressive step, now has become the hallmark of the most conservative forms of 
politics. To read postmodernism and poststructuralism as forms of relativism is, however, not 
entirely correct. This is partly because what was at stake in at least some of the work going 
on under those headings, was not the claim that all knowledge is relative to particular 
frameworks. Here I agree with Habermas (1990) that the pluralisation of worldviews is 
actually a thoroughly modern rather than a postmodern experience. Rather what was at 
stake, was the suggestion that our first questions are not cognitive questions, that is, 
questions about knowledge and truth, but thoroughly moral and political ones, which also 
suggests, that moral and political issues cannot be resolved along cognitive lines but only in 
their own terms. Postmodern and poststructural thought was, in other words, not 
undermining ethics and politics but rather taking ethics and politics seriously in their own 
terms. Also, the critique of modernity was not automatically a critique and rejection of the 
‘project’ of Enlightenment. Foucault (1984), for example, made a clear and explicit distinction 
between the two, arguing against the suggestion that Enlightenment can only be achieved 
through modern means, that is, through increased control of the physical and social world. 
Yet for Foucault this did not mean giving up on the ‘undefined work of freedom’ central to 
the Enlightenment project, but rather entailed trying to make this work possible outside of 
and beyond the logic of control. 
 
This begins to suggest, that an adequate response to the issues of our time and, more 
importantly, an adequate educational response, is unlikely to be found in strategies of 
control, such as getting the agenda for (moral) education right, and using the machinery of 
educational effectiveness research and of the global education measurement industry for 
achieving successful implementation of this agenda. Such a direction is precisely one of the 
main problems of contemporary education, where students, teachers, schools and even 
entire education systems are suffering under the pressure to ‘perform’, not just in the domain 
of cognitive achievement – spurred by PISA and similar systems – but increasingly also in other 
domains, particularly out of arguments for conservative and progressive arguments for 
character education and ‘Bildung’, to name two influential rationales. What such forms of 
strong socialisation often tend to forget, is the simple but fundamental fact of human 
freedom, and the acknowledgement that education has to engage with this, perhaps first and 
foremost through encouraging children and young people to come into a relationship with 
their own freedom (see, for example, Benner, 2015; Biesta, 2017a). This has something to do 
with Adorno’s suggestion that ‘after Auschwitz’ the ‘premier demand upon all education is 
that Auschwitz not happen again’ (see Adorno, 1971, p.79), bearing in mind, however, Primo 
Levi’s observation that precisely because Auschwitz has happened ‘it can happen again’ (Levi, 
1986, p.199). 
 
In this paper I therefore wish to look in a different direction that is not about finding a new 
agenda for moral education and pursing its effective implementation. Rather I wish to focus 
on an underlying and in a sense more fundamental theme which, at this point, I can only 
describe as the relationship between ‘human beings’ and the ‘world’, knowing that all these 
terms are contested and should, of course, be contested. My assumption – perhaps it’s better 
to call it an intuition – is that many of the problems we are currently facing, as practical and 
intellectual problems, have something to do with this relationship and, more specifically, with 
the suggestion that in some way everything begins with and somehow centres on the self – 




(1969, p.35) I wish to characterise this ‘worldview’ as an egological worldview, that is, a 
worldview that follows or obeys to the ‘logic’ of the ego. And what I am interested in and seek 
to explore, are the possibilities for a non-egological worldview and a non-egological future for 
(moral) education. This is a difficult project at many levels – for a first attempt see Biesta 
(2016) – not least because the very idea of a worldview already stems from the framework I 
seek to challenge, but also because as long as we think that worldviews are simply at our 
disposal, are simply there for us to choose, we are also still operating inside the logic of the 
ego. This paper is therefore only a further attempt, not a conclusion. But it is, in my view, 
something that is important to explore, also because these are not just issues that have to do 
with philosophy or the philosophical foundations of education, but issues that go to the very 
heart of the phenomenon of education itself. I present my exploration in three steps. I begin 
with an indication of where I think that the logic of the ego shows up in contemporary 
education. I will then explore philosophically what it might mean to start from somewhere 
else. In the third and final step I exemplify this different starting point briefly in a discussion 
of (the) three gifts of teaching. 
 
Learnification revisited 
When, about ten years ago, I coined the word ‘learnification’ (see Biesta, 2009), it was first 
and foremost in order to denote the problematic impact of the rise of the ‘new language of 
learning’ on the discourse and practice of education. My main concern at the time was that 
the emergence of notions such as ‘learner’, ‘learning environment’, ‘facilitator of learning’ 
and ‘lifelong learning’ – which had replaced older notions of ‘student’, ‘school’, ‘teaching’ and 
‘adult education’ – were all referring to education in terms of learning, without asking what 
the learning was supposed to be about and, more importantly, without asking what the 
learning was supposed to be for. It was particularly the absence of a vigorous debate about 
the purpose of education that worried me most. It prompted me to propose that education 
should always be concerned with and orientated towards three domains of purpose, to which 
I referred as qualification, socialisation and subjectification respectively (see Biesta, 2009; 
2010).  
 
I wish to argue that, ten years on, the learnification-thesis still stands.2 Talk about learning is 
still rife in educational circles, new expressions such as ‘deep learning’, ‘brain-based learning’ 
and ‘machine learning’ have entered the educational conversation, and policy makers 
continue to produce remarkable and, in my view, completely incomprehensible sentences 
such as that schools should ‘deliver at least one year’s growth in learning for every student 
every year’ (Department of Education and Training , 2018, p.xii). While there is evidence of 
an increasing growing interest in the question of the purpose(s) of education (see, e.g., Hattie 
& Nepper Larsen, in press; Onderwijsraad, 2016), much of what can be found in policy, 
research, and practice continues to have a rather one-dimensional focus on learning, also due 
to the dominance of the frameworks promoted by the global education measurement 
industry. It remains important, therefore, to  continue to engage in discussion about the 
purpose(s) of education. 
 
 
2 The term itself seems to have spread, with, to date close to 10,000 hits in google and close to 700 




There was, however, a further dimension to the learnification-thesis which was less 
prominent at the time (and perhaps also less visible to myself initially) but that, over the past 
decade, has become an important strand in my own thinking and writing, and also in my own 
teaching (for the latter see, for example, Biesta, 2015). The key point here is that teaching 
(and the whole spectrum of intentional educational endeavours more generally) should not 
necessarily result in learning, which also means that teaching should not necessarily aim at 
learning. The idea, in other words, is that there is more to teaching than learning, just as there 
is more to education than learning. In order to bring this ‘more’ to the fore, it is important, 
therefore, to ‘free’ teaching from learning (see Biesta, 2015). I found helpful suggestions for 
exploring this dimension of the learnification-thesis in work from American analytic 
philosophy of education which, interestingly, largely predated the rise of the new language 
of learning (see Fenstermacher, 1986; see also Biesta & Stengel, 2016). 
 
The most explicit position here was taken by Paul Komisar, who has argued that ‘learning is 
not what the “teacher” intends to produce’ (Komisar, 1968, p.183) but that the intention of 
teaching might better be captured in terms of the 'awareness' of an 'auditor' – not a learner 
or student for Komisar – ‘who is successfully becoming aware of the point of the act [of 
teaching]’ (Komisar, 1968, p.191; emphasis in original ). And this awareness may cover a 
whole range of different responses, of which learning is only one possibility, but neither the 
sole nor the only one. One important reason for creating a distance between teaching and 
learning and arguing that there is more to education than learning, has to do with the fact 
that there is more to life than learning. There is a range of ways in which human beings exist 
– are in and with the world – and the task of education should rather be about opening up 
this range of ‘existential possibilities’ (Biesta, 2015) for our students, rather than only 
providing them with the position of the learner. Yet the point here is not just ontological – it 
is not just about how we understand our existence as human beings – but also political, 
particularly in response to attempts by policy makers and politicians to force people into the 
‘learning position’, most notably through the ‘politics’ of lifelong learning (see Biesta, 2018). 
 
It is against this background that, in recent years, I have started to make an explicit case for 
the rediscovery of teaching, which I also see as a recovery of teaching (Biesta, 2017a). This is 
partly in order to restore teaching to its proper place in the educational endeavour – to give 
teaching back to education (Biesta, 2012) – and not see it as something outdated and of the 
past that we should be embarrassed about as educators. And it is partly in order to highlight 
that what is distinctive about education is not the phenomenon of learning – which, after all, 
can also happen outside of education and can occur without teaching – but precisely the 
presence of and the encounter with teaching. Whereas learning is accidental to education, 
teaching, so I wish to suggest, is essential to education, albeit that the question what teaching 
is and how it might or should be enacted does, of course, need careful consideration in order 
not to fall back on narrow and naive notions of teaching as (one-directional) instruction or 
teaching as (authoritarian) control. 
 
Whereas learning in some way always originates and emanates from the learner, that is, from 
the one who seeks to acquire knowledge, skills and understanding and approaches the natural 
and social world as a ‘resource’ where this can be found, like an act of foraging, teaching 
moves in the opposite direction as it comes to the student from ‘elsewhere’ (and again the 




it is not necessarily the teacher who is the origin of teaching; on this see also, Prange, 2005). 
Previously (Biesta, 2013), I have explored the latter dynamic in terms of the gift of teaching, 
arguing that it is important to make a distinction between learning from (someone or 
something) and being taught by (someone or something). In this paper I wish to continue the 
exploration of teaching, by highlighting three dimensions of the way in which the ‘givenness’ 
of teaching manifests itself in education – I refer to them as the three gifts of teaching – and 
by showing why and how this givenness matters educationally, also for the work of the 
teacher. In my earlier explorations, writings from Levinas, Derrida and Kierkegaard have been 
particularly helpful. In the next section I will discuss ideas from the work of Jean-Luc Marion 
who, in my view, provides a helpful and important next step in the philosophical discussion 
at stake by zooming in on the phenomenon of ‘givenness’.  
 
Being given 
Over the past four decades the French philosopher Jean-Luc Marion has made major 
contributions in a number of fields, including the history of philosophy, theology and 
phenomenology,  with clear interconnections between his work in these three domains. Even 
a proper reconstruction of Marion’s contributions to phenomenology – articulated in three 
main volumes and numerous other publications (see particularly Marion 1998; 2002a; 2002b; 
2011; 2016) – lies well beyond the scope of this paper. More modestly, I will pick up one 
theme from Marion’s writing and will utilise one particular ‘way in’, in order to shed some 
light on the phenomenon of givenness which, for Marion, also has to do with the givenness 
of the phenomenon. 
 
Exploring givenness 
‘Givenness’ is one of the central themes in Marion’s work, and the question he has been 
pursuing consistently is whether and, if so, how we can make sense of givenness – although 
even phrasing the question in that way raises a problem, because if we really try to make 
sense of givenness, then such givenness does precisely not depend on our acts of sense 
making. This already indicates, first, that Marion’s question has an epistemological dimension, 
namely whether knowledge is constructed by us – either fully or partially – or given to us. But, 
secondly, Marion’s question also has a theological dimension, and it may be better to put this 
question on the table now rather than let it linger in the background.3 Put simply, the question 
here is whether revelation is possible or whether everything that comes to us from ‘beyond’ 
is in some way of our own making which, in theology, is the distinction between natural or 
metaphysical theology on the one hand and revealed theology on the other. This indicates, 
thirdly, that Marion’s question also gets us into the field of hermeneutics, particularly with 
regard to the question as to whether or not the human being is first and foremost an 
interpreting being – a meaning-making animal or, with the words of Kenneth Burke,  a 
‘symbol-using, symbol-making and symbol-misusing animal’ (Burke, 1966, p.6) – or indeed 
whether there is something that precedes and must precede our acts of meaning-making. , 
Fourthly, this means that Marion’s question is also the question of phenomenology, starting 
from Husserl’s ambition to go back to the things themselves rather than our interpretation of 
these things. Which then, and this is the fifth dimension of Marion’s question, also raises the 
 
3 Marion identifies the issue at stake here in the following way: ‘(A) correct understanding of the 
concept of revelation must account for the inevitable resistance that it cannot help to encounter. 
Admittedly, this resistance is not enough to authenticate it, but at the very least a reception without 




question of the ‘I’ as the question whether everything starts from the ‘I’ or whether something 
‘precedes’ the ‘I’ – and what it would take to make sense of what comes ‘before’. 
 
One has to admire Marion for his ambition to engage with this cluster of questions, because 
just from a first attempt at unravelling all the dimensions of the question of givenness we can 
see that we are in the middle of the big questions of modern philosophy and perhaps even 
the big questions of philosophy anyway. Moreover, these questions are not just philosophical 
– they are not just philosophy’s questions – but are perhaps the big questions of human 
existence itself. In one sense, then, they are of all times, but they also speak to major 
contemporary issues. They speak, for example, to neo-liberalism by asking whether the self 
is indeed in the centre of the world and the world is just there for the ‘I’ to conquer and 
master – which means that they speak both to the ecological crisis and the crisis of 
democracy. But they also ask whether a religious worldview, a ‘belief’ in transcendence, is 
outdated superstition that should have no place in a modern world, or whether the encounter 
with transcendence is more difficult to shrug off than many might think (see also Biesta, 
2017b). And from an educational perspective, Marion’s ‘intervention’ is important because it 
asks whether teaching is actually possible, or whether the reduction of all education and 
everything educational to learning is inevitable. 
 
One of the shortest formulations Marion provides of his thoughts on givenness is through the 
‘principle’, as he calls is with some hesitation, ‘that everything that shows itself must first give 
itself’ (Marion, 2011, p.19).4 This phrase already contains an important epistemological point, 
because it suggests that before any intentional ‘act’ of knowing can take place, something 
must have given itself to the knower (although there are further question about what the 
alleged status of a ‘knower’ is and whether we can assume that the knower is already ‘there’ 
before something ‘arrives’ – an option Marion denies; see below). Marion emphasises that 
his principle does not articulate an interest in what is given but in the how of givenness. 
Marion is interested, in other words, in ‘givenness as a mode of phenomenality, as the how 
or manner of the phenomenon’, as he puts it (Marion, 2011, p.19, emphasis in original). This 
is not about ‘the immediate given, the perceptive content, or the lived experience of 
consciousness – in short, of something that is given, but instead of the style of its 
phenomenalization insofar as it is given” (Marion, 2011, p.19, emphasis in original). This 
means that Marion is after a phenomenology of the phenomenon of givenness, so to speak, 
not an ontology or metaphysics of givenness (see Marion, 2011, p.20).5 
 
What is exciting about Marion’s work is that he pursues this ‘agenda’ in the strictest way 
possible. At first sight this often leads to counter-intuitive statements and conclusions, but 
what these statements and conclusions actually do is lay bare our intuitions and question the 
alleged necessity and inevitability of the presuppositions upon which those intuitions are 
 
4 The sentence continues, in brackets, with ‘even if everything that gives itself nevertheless does not 
show itself without remainder’ (Marion, 2011, p.19). 
5 An ontology or metaphysics of givenness would not only try to specify the exact nature of the ‘what’ 
that is given, but would also try to specify what it is that gives this ‘what’. The problem with such an 
ambition is that it goes ‘beyond’ givenness itself and would therefore cease to be an ‘account’ of 
givenness itself. Moreover, it would, in its ambition to go ‘behind’ the phenomenon of givenness, deny 
the very idea that what shows itself must first give itself. It would, in a sense, refuse givenness. This is 




based – which is what counter-intuitive literally means, of course. One important line of 
argumentation challenges the (epistemological) assumption that everything that shows itself 
is supposed to show itself to a pre-existing consciousness. It will not be too difficult to see 
that on such a view the phenomenon begins to disappear – or actually disappears completely 
– because its manifestation, its givenness, is made totally dependent upon the activities of a 
knowing consciousness. This is the Kantian view of knowledge which does indeed start from 
a ‘transcendental ego’ that comes ‘before’ the world and that sees phenomena as objects 
that appear according to the conditions of experience (see Marion, 2016, p.47).6 That is why 
Marion argues that taking givenness seriously means that we have to assume – or perhaps 
‘accept’ is the better word here – that the phenomenon ‘shows itself in itself and from itself’ 
(Marion, 2016, p.48) which also means that it ‘gives itself from itself (Marion, 2016, p.48), and 
is not given or assumed to be given by something or someone else.  
 
A third reduction 
It is here that the connection with phenomenology becomes apparent, because, as Marion 
writes, ‘in its most radical ambitions, philosophy, in the form of phenomenology, has had no 
other goal than this one: to allow the phenomenon to broaden out itself in itself, and to show 
itself from itself’ (Marion, 2016, p.48) – or, in the words of Husserl: back to the things 
themselves! It is here that we find a second original theme in Marion’s work that has to do 
with the status of ‘reduction’ in phenomenology and, more specifically, with his claim that 
phenomenology needs a ‘third’ reduction – not just a reduction to the given object (Husserl) 
or to be being of the given object (Heidegger) but to givenness itself. Reduction, as Marion 
explains, ‘consists in not taking everything I perceive for granted and in not receiving 
everything that happens to me with the same degree of evidence and thus of certainty but in 
each case to question what is actually given in order to distinguish it from what is only pieced 
together, inferred, or, so to say, acquired in a roundabout way, indirectly’ (Marion, 2017, 
pp.72-73). This was central to Husserl’s ‘return to the things themselves’, and also to 
Heidegger’s attempt at articulating the difference between things and their existence (beings 
[in German: Seienden] and their Being [in German: sein]). Yet Marion’s main point – in a 
discussion that is much more sophisticated than I can present here – is that, in a sense, Husserl 
and Heidegger didn’t go far enough with their reductions of the given.7 Marion argues that 
Husserl ‘stopped’ at the object and Heidegger at the being of the object, but for Marion 
‘objectness (Husserl) and beingness (Heidegger) only offer specific and possible cases, but 
surely not the most legitimate ones, of the naming of givenness’ (Marion, 2017, p.78). Hence 
 
6 The following sentence not only shows the anti-Kantian streak in what Marion is trying to do, but 
also gives an important reason for his ‘project’, because for Kant the phenomenon in-itself is the very 
thing that cannot – or perhaps we can say, in order to connect this view explicitly to Kant – can no 
longer appear. Marion writes: ‘(I)n order that the phenomenon show itself in itself and from itself – 
that is, in principle, in order that it abolish the Kantian interdiction that reserved the in-itself to the 
thing insofar as it does not appear – it is necessary that this appearing not owe its appearing to the 
conditions of possibility of a foreign experience (that of the transcendental ego), but that it draw its 
appearing from itself, and itself alone; it thus must happen from itself – in a word, it must give itself’. 
(Marion, 2016, p.48, emphasis in original) 
7 ‘Husserl sees givenness. He sees that one can only reach givenness via reduction, but to a large extent 
he stays within the presupposition that the given is a matter of objectness, of a theory of the object’. 




the need for a third, more original reduction … namely the reduction to givenness (Marion, 
2017, p.79).8 
  
Two attitudes to things 
I don’t have the space in this paper to go into further detail about Marion’s phenomenology 
of givenness, but wish, in concluding this section, to say a bit more about the encounter with 
the phenomenon of givenness in more practical or everyday language, and to do so in order 
to draw out some of the implications for the ‘I’. And all this is important ‘groundwork’ for the 
exploration of teaching that is to follow, because the very possibility of a notion of teaching – 
or perhaps we can begin to say: a phenomenon of teaching – in which teaching cannot be 
reduced to learning but is possible in its own terms and on its own terms depends in some 
way on the answer to the question whether givenness can exist in itself, so to speak, or 
whether it remains dependent on the cognitive acts of the ego. How, then, can we ‘make 
sense’ (with the caveat mentioned above) of what is happening here, and particularly, what 
does taking givenness absolutely seriously imply for the self? 
 
Marion’s response starts from the suggestion that we can have two ‘attitudes’ towards things. 
One the one hand, and this is ‘the most widespread attitude, the one for which we are trained’ 
(Marion, 2017, p.83), consists in ‘reducing the chances that those around us will surprise us; 
consequently we continually learn how to better control them (Marion, 2017, p.83). In this 
attitude ‘we really count on being able to anticipate situations and accidents, to be able to 
react, to control, to correct, to secure’ (Marion, 2017, p.83). This is a world where we find 
ourselves surrounded by objects, ‘which, being essentially functional, function because they 
are intended and conceived to function to our advantage’, and this is done ‘so that we are in 
the centre’ (Marion, 2017, p.83). Through this attitude ‘we live in a world that we organize 
such that we retain from it only those things that can be constituted as objects, only what we 
can grasp with our intelligibility, under the control of a quasi-master and possessor of nature’ 
(Marion, 2017, p.83). We do this, we constitute such an object-ive world in order to rule out 
danger. Yet, so Marion asks, ‘what does ruling out danger mean if not keeping away from the 
unexpected’, from that ‘which cannot be constituted as object, that against which one cannot 
protect oneself?’ (Marion, 2017, p.83) 
 
While this is all good for thinking ahead, for what can be anticipated, ‘this rationality … does 
not want any of the rest [but] only retains this layer of reality that one can call the object’ 
(Marion, 2017, p.84). ‘But the object offers a very thin and superficial layer of things. It leaves 
to the side ... everything it cannot foresee, everything it cannot anticipate, what is said to be 
unknowable. (Marion, 2017, p.84) Yet it is precisely here ‘that the given is displayed because 
it characterizes what among things resists objectification and is given by its own initiative’ 
(Marion, 2017, p.84). It is not so much – and probably not at all – for us to ‘find’ the given, 
that which  gives itself. Rather, as Marion explains, ‘in the given, in the phenomenon inasmuch 
as it gives itself according to its character as nonobject (…) a place and moment are described 
where the ego must know how to allow itself to be found and which it does not decide’ 
(Marion, 2017, p.85). In this way the ego leaves its central position, ‘obeys the event, and sees 
 
8 Marion is not suggesting that Husserl and Heidegger didn’t see this at all. He, rather,  suggests that 
Husserl already went further than Heidegger in some respects. And Marion also honestly confesses 
that he only discovered Heidegger’s earlier work (particularly Heidegger’s 1919 essay on givenness 




without foreseeing’, as Marion puts it, which is precisely the opposite from the seeing-of-
objects. Thus, we encounter a reversal of our objective relation to the world. ‘In the case of 
the given, we find ourselves commanded by the thing, summoned to come experience it’ 
(Marion, 2017, p.85).9 
 
Although ‘givenness’ so conceived may give the suggestion that it requires passive receptivity 
from the side of the ego, Marion stresses that the term ‘passivity’ is not good enough precisely 
‘because I cannot remain passive in front of the event: I make myself available or I avoid it, I 
take a risk or I run away, in short, I still decide, and I respond even by refusing to respond’ 
(Marion, 2017, p.85). This means that in order to ‘become passive’ in such an encounter, ‘a 
certain kind of activity is required; one must leave oneself exposed to things with a certain 
amount of courage’ (Marion, 2017, pp.85-86; see also Biesta, 2017c). This, then, opens up ‘a 
different regime of phenomenality imposed on a different regime of subjectivity’, as Marion 
puts it. Here the subject is no longer before the world, before the phenomenon – in space and 
in time – but rather ‘receives itself from what it receives’ (Marion, 2017, p.86). The word that 
Marion uses for this different ‘stature’ of subjectivity, this different ‘stature’ for the ‘I’ is, in 
French, the adonné, usually translated in English as the ‘gifted’. 
 
This reveals that Marion’s attempt to ‘think’ givenness in its own terms – but perhaps we can 
now say: Marion’s attempt to expose himself to givenness and encourage us to expose 
ourselves as well – is not just a matter of epistemology, and not just a matter of 
phenomenology, although the question of givenness opens up these fields in new ways as 
well, but is also an existential matter, a matter that concerns the existence of the ‘I’ or self or 
subject. That is why Marion emphasises that ‘everything takes on a different meaning if what 
happens to me is given to me from elsewhere’(Marion, 2017, p.38). If what happens to me ‘is 
a duplication and a product of myself, then even the most marvellous things lose their 
meaning’ (Marion, 2017, p.38). But if one instead thinks the world as ‘essentially an 
experience of heteronomy, in other words as election, then everything is worth being lived, 
being expected, being desired, everything merits making an effort on its behalf’ (Marion, 
2017, p.38) Yet before trying to respond to the call ‘there is the more difficult thing, which is 
… to discover that there is a call, that is to say, being able to interpret what is as what comes 
to us’ (Marion, 2017, p.39). And ‘this decision to take things as calls … decides everything else’ 
(Marion, 2017, p.39). 
 
So how then can this help us to get closer to the phenomenon of education and the crucial 
role that teaching plays within it? Let me consider this question by looking at the givenness 
of teaching through three ways in which this givenness manifests itself in teaching and as 
teaching. 
 
The three gifts of teaching 
I have already referred to the redefinition of teaching as facilitating learning; a redefinition 
that is part of a more general shift from teaching to learning and one instance of the ongoing 
learnification of education. The shift from teaching to learning is itself not entirely without 
 
9 Marion gives the example of a painting in the cloister of the convent of Trinity-on-the-Mount which 
has a secret point where one must be situated to see the painting. This point, Marion explains, ‘is 
determined by the painting and not by the spectator” so that “the spectator must obey the painting 




reason. It is a response to authoritarian forms of education in which teaching is enacted as a 
form of control – and there are still too many of those practices around, including those that 
may look benign. The shift from teaching to learning is also a response to rather poor and 
unimaginative educational practices that are nowadays often referred to as traditional, 
didactic or transmissive teaching, although these three qualifications are misleading in my 
view. And the shift from teaching to learning is also the result of the influence of constructivist 
theories of learning and social-cultural approaches to education that all, in some way, argue 
that everything hangs on the activities of ‘the learner’, with or without some scaffolding. In 
this regard we might say that contemporary education is still remarkably Kantian, and has 
perhaps even become more Kantian in recent years at least, that is, where it concerns its 
epistemological underpinnings. 
 
All this has moved ‘the learner’ to the centre of the educational endeavour and has 
manoeuvred the teacher to the side-line – coach, facilitator, fellow-learner, friend, critical or 
otherwise, but hardly ever teacher. And it has given the impression that teaching is outdated, 
undesirable and, according to constructivist ‘dogma’, even impossible. While for some this 
can mean nothing but the end of teaching, I wish, in this section to point at three dimensions 
or ‘manifestations’ of teaching that are not that easy to dispose of, at least not from an 
educational angle which, as I will argue as well, is fundamentally different from and hence not 
reducible to learning. 
 
The first gift of teaching: Being given what you didn’t ask for 
In learner-centred education we do not just hear that the work of the teacher should focus 
on learners and their learning. We also increasingly hear that learners should take 
responsibility for their own learning, should self-regulate their learning, and should take 
ownership of their own learning, as all this will supposedly make the learning better.10 Such 
arguments are not just given in relation to the process of learning – if such a thing exists – but 
also with regard to its content. When it is suggested, for example, that students should set 
their own learning goals, it often also means that students should decide about the content 
of their learning, that is, about what they should be learning, for example because they have 
come to the conclusions that this is their specific ‘learning need’. This line of thinking is further 
amplified because of the impact of neo-liberal, market-driven reforms of education in which 
students – or their parents – are increasingly positioned as customers on the learning market 
and teachers and educational institutions as the providers. The key idea here is that the 
responsibility of teachers, schools, colleges and universities is to satisfy their customers by 
giving them what they ask for.  
 
Yet here, I think, the argument breaks down – which is not to suggest that the rhetoric is 
absent; on the contrary – because an important rationale for education is precisely to give 
students what they didn’t ask for, first and foremost because they didn’t even know they could 
ask for it. This is the good old and nonetheless still relevant rationale of liberal education 
which always seeks to bring students ‘beyond the present and the particular’ (Bailey, 1984). 
But it also has to do with the important distinction between servicing the needs of ‘customers’ 
 
10 Note that in much of these discussions the question of what the learning is ‘about’ and ‘for’ is not 
even raised, let alone addressed. Nonetheless it is remarkably – and worrying – how popular these 




and contributing to the definition of such needs (on this distinction see Feinberg, 2001), in 
light of which one could – and should – argue that the work of educational professionals is 
not just that of giving students what they ask for, but to engage, with them, in a process of 
figuring out what it is they might ‘need’ (just as in the medical profession the work of doctors 
in not just to give patients what they ask for but rather figure out what it is they might need). 
 
Whereas everyone is of course free to learn that they want to learn, the whole point of 
education – if we bring together time, resources and people – is to give students more, so we 
might say; to give them what they didn’t ask for, were not looking for, were not even aware 
they might be looking for. This has to do with teaching as ‘turning’ (Plato), as ‘pointing’ (Klaus 
Prange), or as attention formation (Bernard Stiegler; see also Rytzler, 2017), that is with the 
‘gesture’ where as teachers we say, in all kinds of ways: look, there is something there that 
may be important for you to encounter, explore, have a look at, engage with, stay with, let 
into your life, and so on (see also Biesta, 2017c). This is the first gift of teaching; a gift for 
which we need a school, not as a place for learning but as a place where you may find what 
you were not looking for and may receive what you did not ask for. The school, perhaps, as a 
place of revelation. 
 
The second gift of teaching: Double truth giving 
If the first gift of teaching lies in the domain of curriculum – of the ‘what’ the student will 
encounter – the second gift lies in the domain of ‘didactics’ (to use the Continental phrase) or 
‘pedagogy’ or ‘instruction’, and is the idea that teaching is fundamentally an act of what 
Kierkegaard calls ‘double truth giving’ (see Kierkegaard, 1985; Westphal, 2008). Put simply, 
the idea here is that teaching is not just about giving students the truth, as Kierkegaard puts 
it, but also about giving them the conditions ‘of recognizing it as truth’ (Westphal, 2008, p.25; 
see also Kierkegaard, 1985, p.14).  
 
There is a complex philosophical discussion in the background (which is actually first of all a 
theological discussion about the possibility of revelation; see Westphal, 2008), but the point 
Kierkegaard is making here is actually remarkably practical and ‘down to earth’ and is a very 
effective critique of the idea that teaching could simply be about giving students knowledge. 
The whole point, after all, is that in order to recognize something as knowledge – or more 
widely to recognise something as meaningful – one needs not only the ‘material’ itself but 
also needs to have, and be on the inside of, the ‘frame’ within which something makes sense, 
can be appreciated as knowledge, and so on. The difficult work of teaching, therefore, is not 
that of providing students with information, but is that of pulling them ‘inside’ the frame 
within which such information begins to make sense and is able to make sense. It is precisely 
this latter act of ‘pulling’ that fundamentally goes beyond all the sense making that students 
are capable of up to the point where they encounter something new, something radically 
‘beyond’ their own (current) understanding. This is, therefore, not something students can 
construct themselves from their current understanding, but is something that ‘breaks 
through’, so we might say; something that is literally given (rather than taken).11 
 
11 The concrete example that I have encountered many times as a student was of my mathematics 
teachers who were able to do spectacular things on the blackboard and, when they met my puzzled 
gaze, could say no more than ‘but can’t you see it?’ And the whole problem was of  course that I was 
unable to see what I should be seeing – I was outside of the ‘frame’ – whereas my teacher was inside 





Here, then, do we encounter the second gift of teaching, where we are not just given what 
lies within the scope of our current understanding, but are given what lies beyond that scope, 
so that new understanding becomes available. And this, to make the point one more time, is 
perhaps the only thing we, as students – or ‘learners’ – cannot construct for ourselves (see 
also Roth, 2011, for a very detailed discussion of these predicaments). 
 
The third gift of teaching: Being given yourself 
If the first and second gift of teaching have something to do with the domains of qualification 
and socialisation, the third gift moves us to the domain of subjectification which, as I have 
briefly indicated above, is the third of the three domains of educational purpose. Although 
the idea of the threefold purpose of education has been taken up in many contexts and 
settings, the third domain, that of subjectification, remains remarkably misunderstood, 
perhaps because of the dominance of psychological modes of thinking in contemporary 
education.12 Again put simply, subjectification refers to the existence of the student – or 
human beings more generally – as subjects and not as objects. Subjectification thus refers to 
the educational dynamics that have to do with the existence of students-as-subjects, and the 
word ‘existence’ is helpful here, because subject-ness is precisely to be understood as a way 
of existing. It is located, in other words, on the existential plane which means that it is a first-
person matter – my existing as subject is something no one else can ‘do’ for me.  
 
This means that subjectification as an educational dynamic has nothing to do with psycho-
socio-neurological development, or with enculturation or cultivation (see Biesta, in press[b]). 
Such processes, which are part of the reality of education, all contribute to the identity of 
individuals, that is to who they become as a result of interactions with the environment, 
broadly conceived. One could use the term ‘cultivation’ as an overarching concept here, 
suggesting that the biological organism becomes cultivated through its interaction with 
‘culture’ in the broad sense of the word. All this contributes to the formation of the individual 
– and can even be understood as a process of individuation, which also means that cultivation 
is not a process of the production of clones. Yet our existence as subject is not identical to 
this. To put it briefly, the question of our existence as subject is not about who we become 
but about what we will do with who we have become. If the first question is the question of 
who we are – the question of identity – the second question – that of our subject-ness – is 
the question of how we are, how we will exist, how we will lead our life, how we will respond 
to the challenges that come our way. We can put moral terms such as ‘responsibility’ here, 
but interestingly we can also do without those terms in getting a sense of what subject-ness 
entails. 
 
Whereas in the English language these differences tend to disappear rather quickly under the 
one word of ‘education’, the German tradition has the interesting distinction between two 
 
teachers being very good at pulling me inside the frame. The fact that from a very unsuccessful student 
of physics in secondary school I became a rather successful teacher of physics was perhaps due to my 
experiences with the frame and how to get students ‘inside’. 
12 Misunderstandings are often visible in the language that is used as people tend to avoid the rather 
‘philosophical’ or ‘theoretical’ notion of subjectification. Hence, I have encountered notions such as 
personal development, identity formation and even personification as approximations of 




modalities of education, that of ‘Bildung’ and that of ‘Erziehung’. Following Benner (2015) we 
might say that ‘Bildung’ is about education as cultivation, whereas ‘Erziehung’ is about 
education as subjectification. And the interesting and in my view very helpful phrase Benner 
uses in this context is to define Erziehung as ‘Aufforderung zur Selbsttätigkeit’. This literally 
translates as summoning to self-action, but the injunction here is not to be active, and also 
not to just be yourself, but rather to be a self – rather than just someone. Positively we might 
say that subject-ness emerges in response to the question “Hey, you there, where are you?” 
– and this simple phrase captures the ‘essence’ of ‘Erziehung’ rather well. Negatively I am 
reminded of an interesting formulation Jacques Rancière (2010) has given of the work of the 
emancipatory schoolmaster, namely as the one who forbids his students the pleasure of not 
being a subject, as it is indeed much easier to let other people decide for you than to have to 
decide for yourself. 
 
The point I am making here is that our subject-ness is not something that we construct from 
the inside-out, so to speak, but that it is in response to this question – which can take many 
different forms and manifestations of course – that the self is given to itself, as Marion might 
put it. This, then, is the third gift of teaching where we are not just being given what we didn’t 
ask for, and not just being given the conditions under which we can recognise something as 
true or meaningful, but where we are being given ourselves, our subject-ness, which, but this 




I have suggested that the self occupies the centre of the modern ‘experience’, so to speak, 
not just as a self who masters and controls the world – or at least tries to do so – but also as 
a self who gives meaning to and constructs knowledge about the world. One way to 
understand the current ‘crises’ we are encountering is that this self-positioning of the self has 
gone too far, and not just has reached its limits but is encountering limits – first and foremost 
the limits the planet imposes upon us, and also the limits which the existence of other human 
beings and our existence with other human beings imposes upon us. These are very practical 
problems and also very urgent problems, as I have tried to indicate at the start of this paper. 
They also pose complex and profound philosophical questions. But what I have tried to 
indicate as well in this paper, is that they also go to the heart of education where 
contemporary learner-centred education which thinks that it has successfully ‘overcome’ 
teaching is an explicit expression of self-centred or ego-logical ways of thinking and doing. In 
this paper I have tried to show what the problems with such an approach are, which 
philosophical questions we encounter when we try to go in the opposite direction, and why 
such a direction may nonetheless be important, also to retain a sense of education that 
doesn’t dissolve (itself) into learning. All this suggests a different possibility and perhaps even 
a different future for moral education, one where moral education is neither reduced to 
strong moral socialisation – the enactment of teaching as control – nor left entirely to 
‘learners’ and their ‘learning’ on the mistaken assumption that freedom is the total absence 
of control. Rather the ideas presented in this paper hint at a different ‘articulation’ of our 
human condition, a different ‘account’ of our being-in-and-with-the-world, where we our 
called by the world and even are called into existence by the world. It is here that our 




Although they require further work, I hope at least to have managed to lay the groundwork 
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